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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from a divorce and custody case in magistrate court. Matters before
the trial court included issues of grounds for divorce, child custody, child support, a purported
marital settlement agreement, separate and community property, property division and spousal
maintenance. Issues before this Court pertain primarily to property and spousal maintenance.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

This matter was tried before the Magistrate Court on July 1, 2, 8 and 9, 2015 with the
Honorable Penny J. Stanford, presiding. Prior to the trial the Magistrate Court ruled on cross
motions for summary judgment that Veronika's apartment located in Prague, Czech Republic
was community property. Moreover, the Magistrate found that a purported marriage settlement
agreement signed by Veronika was invalid and unenforceable. A Memorandum Decision was
entered on January 29, 2016. Jerry filed timely appeal to the District Court. The District Court
heard oral argument on March 30, 2017, and issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Appeal on April 28, 2017. Jerry timely appealed.

III.

FACTS

Jerry and Veronika met in 1998 and were married in June 2003. Veronika is from the
Czech Republic, with English as her second language. Jerry is an American and a nationally
recognized investment professional with over 25 years of experience dealing with dynamic,
volatile and highly leveraged trade accounts. At the time of trial, Jerry was an owner of a
successful financial management company, Straight Line Investments Group, LLC ("Straight
Line").
Respondent's Brief
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At the outset of their marriage, Jerry and Veronika agreed that he would be the primary
income earner, and she would for the most part stay home and raise Jerry's children, in addition
to their own child, J.P (born 2010). In 2004 Veronika obtained part time employment at the
Willow Tree Art Gallery in Idaho Falls, where she has worked ever since.
In 1991 Jerry began working in the capacity of an independent contractor for a financial
management firm called IDS. In 1995, IDS became American Express Financial Advisors, and
in 2005 it became Ameriprise Financial. In 2005, while still affiliated with Ameriprise, Jerry
formed Jerry Papin Support Services ("JPSS").
In 2011 the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") opened an investigation
into JPSS regarding a rule violation. FINRA made a number of requests for infonnation, to
which Jerry refused to comply.
On August 31, 2011 Jerry sold his entire book of business, including all his client files,
computer data and records to Brinton Webb, another financial advisor located out of Salt Lake
City, Utah, for $504,000.00. Tr. Vol. I, p. 232, I. 6-8; p. 229, I. 23-25. This amount included
consulting fees, interest, payment for assets and any and all other costs, fees , expenses,
compensation and enumerations due buyer to seller. Tr. Vol. I., p. 230, I. 13-20. Also included in
this sale were all accounts receivable and work in process owned by Jerry and due payable to
Jerry as of the transfer date. Tr. Vol. I. , pg. 234, I. 2-18. Mr. Webb was to pay Jerry monthly
installments of $ 10,500.00. Tr. Vol. I., p. 232, I. 15-25. If, after the sale of the business, Jerry
received any income from Ameriprise, it was the property of Mr. Webb. Tr. Vol. I., p. 235, I. 322. Nowhere in the purchase and sale agreement were the items to be sold enumerated or
itemized for value. Contained within the Purchase and Sale Agreement was a provision that
allowed Jerry to continue working in the financial industry and to re-acquire clients from Mr.
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Webb. As consideration for this provision, the actual amount owed to Jerry from Mr. Webb was
$367,500.00.
On September 1, 2011 Jerry entered into an Operating Agreement with Melissa Davis
("Melissa"), to operate the new entity Straight Line Investments Group. Tr. Vol. I., p 271 , 1. 1-12.
According to their agreement, Jerry and Melissa each owned 50% of Straight Line. On October
10, 2011 Jerry and Melissa then fonned Straight Line Investments Group. Tr. Vol. I., p. 270, 1. 15. At the time Straight Line was formed, there were no clients and the value of the business was
set at $10.00. Tr.Vol. I., p. 272, I. 1-4; p. 360., 1. 21-22. At this point, Jerry began the process of
soliciting certain clients back from Mr. Webb, and transferring their accounts to Straight Line.
On July 5, 2013 Jerry and Melissa signed a new Operating Agreement for Straight Line. The new
Operating Agreement stated that each member 's interest was now valued at $ 105,413.34. Tr. Vol.

I., p. 278, 1. 15-16.
In September 2013 Jerry was barred from associating with any FINRA registered firm in
any capacity. Tr. Vol. I., p. 291, I. 6-14.
During the summer of 2013, while Jerry was on active duty in Afghanistan, he had an
attorney draft a document entitled A Covenant Affirming the Separate Business Property of

Melissa Davis and Jerry A. Papin, Jr. ("Covenant"). This Covenant affinned Jerry and Melissa's
desire to form a partnership, and for Straight Line to be their sole and separate property. Tr. Vol. I
p. 311-316. The Covenant did not memorialize an agreement between Jerry and Veronika, nor
Melissa and her spouse, Adam Davis. The Covenant was signed only by Veronika and Mr. Davis.
There was no language contained within the Covenant which purported to convey Straight Line
to Jerry and Melissa, or transmute Straight Line to separate property. There was no disclosure in
the Covenant about the value of the entity which Jerry and Melissa desired to be their separate

Respondent's Brief

9

property. The Covenant regularly referred to "the parties," but from the face of the document it
appears that "parties" refers to Veronika and Adam.
Veronika purportedly signed the Covenant in July 2013 while Jerry was out of the
country. She has stated that she first became aware of this document only after the divorce was
filed and she was presented with it during the Temporary Orders stage of litigation. R. Vol. I., p.
269-272. Veronika was never told by Jerry that he desired for her to sign a document which
would strip her of her community property rights in the event of divorce. Melissa handed
Veronika the Covenant together with other business documents with no explanation of what it
was or the provisions it contained. Id. Conveniently, Jerry returned home in January 2014 and
infonned Veronika that he wanted a divorce. Id.
The parties each filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of the validity of
the Covenant. At the proceeding the Magistrate Court held that the Covenant was not valid and
thus Jerry bore the burden of proving his separate property interest, if any, through proper tracing
and accounting at trial. On March 17, 2014, Straight Line was dissolved. Tr. Vol. I. , p. 287-288, I.
22-25, 107.
At trial, both parties solicited expert opinions as to the property characterization and
value of Straight Line. Veronika's expert was Terry Gazdik, a partner at Cooper Norman
Accounting Firm in Idaho Falls. Jerry's expert was David Smith, of Smith & Co., also located in
Idaho Falls.
Mr. Smith provided a report to the Court with his expert opinion contained therein . Mr.
Smith stated that if the Covenant was valid, then l 00% of Jerry's interest in Straight Line was his
separate property. He stated that if the Covenant was invalid, then 97% of Jerry's interest in
Straight Line would still be his separate property. Based upon information and assumptions
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provided to him by Jerry and manufactured by Jerry, Mr. Smith assumed that only 3% of assets
under management sold to Mr. Webb were acquired after marriage, and that the remaining 97%
were acquired prior to the marriage. To make this point, Mr. Smith relied on a client list
manufactured by Jerry, which contained the following infonnation: the client initials, the year
they were acquired as clients by Jerry, and the amount of assets under management when sold to
Mr. Webb. He was also provided with some MPCU bank statements, the Charles Schwab bank
statements, Charles Schwab broker account statements, the "Covenant" signed by Veronika, a
life insurance policy cash surrender value, and a purchase agreement for a 2012 Dodge Durango.
Mr. Smith was not provided with an objective, third party business record which would
have provided the clients' actual names; account numbers; the date they were acquired as clients
by Jerry; the assets under management at the time of acquisition; the date they were sold to Mr.
Webb; the assets under management at the time they were sold to Mr. Webb; the clients who
were reacquired from Mr. Webb and the assets under management at the time they were
reacquired . Additionally, he was not provided with the Purchase Sale Agreement between Jerry
and Mr. Webb, the deposition of Jerry Papin, individual or business tax returns, or any other
actual business records. Mr. Smith was basically asked by Jerry to render an expert opinion
based upon self-serving assumptions provided by Jerry.
Finally, Mr. Smith determined that the value of the clients that were reacquired from Mr.
Webb, and the profits that were generated from their accounts were grown merely by natural
market fluctuations, and not as a result of Jerry's efforts as a financial advisor. According to this
theory, Jerry was able to collect an annual service fee of I% - 2% of his clients' total accounts,
for doing no work for them whatsoever. Notably, this would contradict Jerry's deposition
testimony that "we are performing our duties all the time. I mean, before, on that day, thereafter,
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as long as the client 1s with us we're performing our management duties." Jerry Papin s

Deposition, page 62.
Despite repeated efforts to acquire legitimate accounting and tracing records, Veronika's
expert was only provided with the client list manufactured by Jerry, but no third-party document
verifying the accuracy or veracity of this list or the values contained therein. Tr. Vol. I, p. 340, I.
13-22; p. 341 , p. 341 , I. 8-22. Jerry also refused to provide to her any documentation which
would show deposits into client accounts from the time the parties were married until the time
the business was sold in 2011. Tr. Vol. I., p. 344, I. 5-9.
In Mr. Smith's Opinion #3, he states that if the Covenant is not a valid agreement, then
97% of the $367,500.00 proceeds from the sale of the client list to Mr. Webb is Jerry's separate
property. Mr. Smith went on to state that $229,529.40 of those funds were separate property, and
of that separate property, $183,358.65 remains in the MPCU account. Mr. Smith also testified
that $25,000.00 of those separate funds were withdrawn from the MPCU account and deposited
into the Schwab Joint Investment Account (acct. no. 1216-3224). According to Mr. Smith, only
$13,154.65 of Jerry's separate property remains in the Schwab Investment Account as a result of
market depreciation. Id.
Ms. Gazdik testified that she could trace funds from the sale being deposited into the joint
MPCU account, but not being taken out in any discemable fashion . No actual tracing had been
done by Mr. Smith. Tr. Vol. I., p. 353, I. 18-25, p . 353, I. 2-3 .
Jerry owned a home prior to the marriage, purchased in 1993, and then refinanced in
2001. The primary dispute at trial regarding the marital home was what the balance of the
mortgage was at the time of marriage, and whether Veronika was entitled to reimbursement for
the community's payment of the property taxes.
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Veronika provided a refinance document which showed the home was refinanced in 2001
with a principal balance of $93,075.00, at 6.141 % APR, and a monthly mortgage of $785.42.

Trial Exhibit 29. Veronika testified that during the marriage the community overpaid on the
mortgage by paying $1500.00 each month from their joint bank account. She provided a bank
statement from January 2004 showing a $1500.00 mortgage payment from that account to the
mortgage lender. Trial Exhibit 55. The mortgage was paid off on February 19, 2008. Trial Exhibit
30 indicates that the community paid an additional $714.58 plus the regular mortgage of $785.42
(totaling exactly $1500.00) to pay off the loan in full. Thus, Veronika entered into evidence two
documents from two different points in time showing that the parties were making $1500.00
payments towards the mortgage during the marriage. Ms. Gazdik testified that pursuant to her
calculations based on the amortization schedule- using an accelerated mortgage payment
throughout the term of the mortgage to pay it off on February 19, 2008, that the principal balance
of the mortgage on the date of the marriage was $72,680.57.
Jerry testified that from October 2001 (when the home was refinanced) to June 2003 , he
overpaid on his mortgage, but that once the parties were married he only made the minimum
$785.42 payments each month. Jerry provided the Court with his own amortization schedule
which showed that if he made $785.42 payments from the date of marriage until February 19,
2008 the beginning balance of the mortgage would have been $39,921.00. Trial Exhibit GGGG.
However, Jerry failed to factor in two years' worth of alleged overpayments made between
October 2001 and June 2003.
In her Memorandum Decision, the Magistrate found that the marriage broke down as a
result of irreconcilable differences. At trial, Veronika testified that the marriage broke down as a
result of extreme cruelty, and Jerry argued that the marriage broke down as a result of adultery.
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Veronika testified that after Jerry returned from deployment in Afghanistan in July 2014
that he became hyper-controlling and rigid with her. Tr. Vol. II, p. 761, I. 1-25; p. 762, I. 1-25; p.
766, I. 1-25. She testified that he became very aggressive with her sexually, which included
physical abuse and non-consensual sexual activity. Tr. Vol. II, p. 768, I. 9-25; p. 769, I. 1-4. She
also testified that Jerry became increasingly insistent that she quit her job at the Willowtree
Gallery so that she could do more cooking and cleaning for him. Tr. Vol. II, p. 770, I. 16-25. Jerry
denied these allegations.
Jerry testified that Veronika was having an extramarital affair with a man named "Palo."
He testified that he believed Veronika met Palo while he was deployed, and that when she and
Palo met Veronika became more distant and spent more time away from Jerry. Tr. Vol. II, p.
1119, I. 17-25; p. 1123, I. 8-13 . Jerry had witnesses testify to their belief that Veronika was
having an affair with Palov. Veronika denied these allegations.

APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the District Court err by determining that the Covenant was not valid?

2. Did the District Court err by upholding the Magistrate's award of summary judgment to
Veronika?
3. Did the District Court err by upholding the Magistrate's determination that Jerry' s
preexisting separate property business was community property?
4. Did the District Court err in upholding the Magistrate's determination that the sale
proceeds from a portion of Jerry's preexisting business were community property?
5. Did the District Court err in upholding the Magistrate's detennination that SLG was a
community property asset and in determining its value?
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6. Did the District Court err in upholding the Magistrate' s detennination pennitting certain
evidence to be entered regarding the alleged community property amount of equity in
Jerry' s separate property home including, without limitation, reimbursement for property
tax liability?
7. Did the District Court err in upholding the Magistrate's determination in its ultimate
division of property and debt including, without limitation, the characterization and
allocation of personal property?

8. Did the District Court err in upholding the Magistrate's ruling that Jerry did not have
grounds for a divorce based on Veronika's adultery?
9. Did the District Court err in upholding the Magistrate's determination m awarding
spousal maintenance?

I 0. Did the District Court err in upholding the Magistrate' s determination err in awarding
Veronika attorney fees?

STAND ARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, the
Supreme Court directly reviews the district court's decision." Kraly v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 302,
208 P.3d 281, 284 (2009). The Court reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there
is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings . Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855,
858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18 (2013). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions
follow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, the appellate court
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affirms the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id. Thus, the appellate courts do not
review the decision of the magistrate but are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision
of the district court. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012). The Court
exercises free review over issues of law. Garner v. Garner, 158 Idaho 932, 935, 354 P.3d 494,
497 (20 15); Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21 , 23 , 232 P.3d 799, 801 (2010). "It is well
established that this Court will use the correct legal theory to affirm the correct decision of a
district court even when it is based on an erroneous legal theory." JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State

Tax Comm'n , 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 P.2d 1206, 1210 (1991) .
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, which is to
say that findings that are based upon substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence
will not be disturbed on appeal. DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571,976 P.2d
922, 925 (1999). The credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the province of the trial
court, and the appellate court liberally construes the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the
judgment entered . Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751 ,
755 (1999) .
The characterization of property as either community or separate presents a mixed
question of law and fact. Kraly, 147 Idaho at 303, 208 P.3d at 285. Although the manner and
method of acquisition of property are questions of fact for the trial court, the characterization of
an asset in light of the facts found is a question of law over which the Court exercises free
review. Id.
The trial court 's valuation of community property is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 249, 32 P.3d 140, 143 (2001). The trial court 's award or
denial of maintenance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
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Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 80 P.3d 1049 (2003). An award of attorney fees under LC.§ 32-704
is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 465; 80 P.3d. at I 066.
When reviewing a trial court's decision for abuse of discretion the appellate court must
ask, (I) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason.

Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 454, 80 P .3d at I 055.

An abuse of discretion will be found if the magistrate's findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence or if the magistrate does not correctly apply the law. Moffett v. Moffett, 151
Idaho 90, 253 P.3d 764 (Ct.App. 2011).
An appellate court may affirm a lower court's decision on a legal theory different from
the one applied by that court. In re Estate ofBagley, l 17 Idaho 109 l , I 093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265
(Ct.App.1990).
Under Rule 505 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure, summary judgment is
proper if 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."' See, Silicon Int'! Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538,
544, 314 P.3d 593, 599 (2013) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). If a review of the evidence reveals no
disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v. Meridian

Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88 (1996).
"The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the
moving party," and the Court " will construe the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's
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favor." Wesco Auto body Supply Inc. v. Ernest, l 49 Idaho 881, 890, 243 P .3d 1069, l 078 (20 l 0).
Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 39 l ,
394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003). However, a "mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to
the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes
of summary judgment." Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986
(2009).

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE MAGISTRATE'S DETERMINATION ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. The Lower Courts Did Not Improperly Raise Issues Sua Sponte
The parties brought dueling summary judgment motions based on the Covenant. In her
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Veronika challenged the validity of
the agreement and asked the Magistrate "to find that, as a matter of law, this Covenant is not an
enforceable marital agreement." R. Vol. I, p. 284. Jerry sought summary judgment on separate
property issues based on the Covenant, and specifically asked the Magistrate to find that the
"Covenant Affinning Separate Business Property is a valid post marital agreement." R. Vol I, p.
340. Jerry therefore placed the entire Covenant at issue. He was asking the Magistrate to find as
a matter of law that there was a valid, binding marriage settlement agreement that controlled.
This necessarily required the magistrate to examine the Covenant and not simply take Jerry's
word for it that it was valid. It is disingenuous for Jerry to complain that the Magistrate did what
he asked her to do - review the Covenant for validity.
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While courts generally may not sua sponte raise legal theories the parties have not
asserted,Deon v. H &J, Inc., 157 Idaho 665, 669-71, 339 P.3d 550, 554-56 (2014); Thomson v.

Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994), such was not
the case here. Jerry was clearly on notice, and the validity of the Covenant was properly before
the magistrate court, as it was pled in both his and Veronika' s motions. See, Hodge v. Waggoner,
No. 45336 (Idaho July 27, 2018); Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 195 P.3d 1212 (2008). The
most critical fact and piece of evidence submitted to the Magistrate was the Covenant itself,
which was proffered and undisputed by both parties. As a moving party asserting the Covenant,
JeITy should have been prepared to establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
the validity of the Covenant, and that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Wesco Autobody, 149 Idaho 881,890,243 P.3d 1069, 1078 (2010). Had Veronika not filed her
motion for summary judgment the validity of the Covenant would still have been at issue.
Jerry's own motion placed the Covenant at risk of being invalidated.
This Court has held, "A motion for summary judgment allows the court to rule on the
issues placed before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court will find
against it." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612, 617 (2001). "Summary
judgment may be rendered for any party, not just the moving party, on any or all the causes of
action involved" thus allowing trial courts flexibility in determining the form of relief granted
in summary judgment orders. Brummett v. Ediger, 106 Idaho 724, 726, 682 P.2d 1271 , 1273
(1984).
The primary concern in cases which have addressed the allegation that the trial court
raised an issue sua sponte on summary judgment is the principle that "[t]he party against whom
the judgment will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to
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demonstrate why summary judgment should not be entered." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,
39 P.3d 612 (2001). See also, Hodge v. Waggoner, No. 45336 (Idaho July 27, 2018); Fed. Nat.

Mortg. Ass 'n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 699, n.6, 351 P.3d 622, 627 (2015); Massey v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc. , 156 Idaho 476, 328 P.3d 456 (2014); Idaho Endowment Fund Inv. Board v.
Crane, 135 Idaho 667, 671, 23 P.3d 129, 133 (2001); Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126
Idaho 527, 530-31 , 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994); Mason v. Tucker &Assocs., 125 Idaho 429,
431-32, 871 P.2d 846, 848-49 (Ct. App. 1994). In this case, Jerry was on clear notice that the
validity of the Covenant was at issue. The Magistrate also gave both parties an additional
opportunity to prepare and to argue whether the facial deficiencies of the Covenant did or did not
invalidate it as a marital settlement agreement.
There was nothing improper in the lower courts' review of the Covenant. As requested
by both parties, the Magistrate examined the Covenant for validity. The magistrate looked at the
Covenant on its face and identified facts about it that would as a matter of law invalidate it as a
marital settlement agreement. Likewise, in reviewing the decision of the magistrate, the District
Court looked at the Covenant on its face and determined as a matter of law that the Covenant
was invalid as a marital settlement agreement.

B. Requirements for a Marital Settlement Agreement
Jerry did not argue below, nor can he now argue, that Veronika made a gift of her
community property interest, for in fact he maintains the property at issue was always his
separate property, but rather that there was a valid marriage settlement agreement - a contract
between the parties, See, Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (I 992);

Wolford v. Wolford, 117 Idaho 61, 785 P.2d 625 (1990) - that controls on the issue of whether
his interest in Straight Line is separate or community.
Respondent's Brief
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Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly used the tenn "marriage settlement" to refer not
only to prenuptial agreements, but also to agreements made with an eye towards separation
and/or divorce. Stevens v. Stevens, 135 Idaho 224, 228, 16 P.3d 900, 904 (2000).

Because

agreements made in contemplation of divorce are "marriage settlements" they are subject to LC.

§ 32-91 ?'s requirement that they be in writing and executed and acknowledged in like manner as
conveyances of land. Id. The general rule for conveyances of land states: "A conveyance of an
estate in real property may be made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party
disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing. The name of the grantee
and his complete mailing address must appear on such instrument." I.C. § 55-601.

The

requirements of I.C. § 32-917 do not mean that a marriage settlement agreement is a conveyance,
merely that the contract must comply with the same formalities as a conveyance of land.

It is also "well established in Idaho that when construing a party's settlement agreement,
normal rule[ s] of contract construction apply." Bondy, 121 Idaho at 996, 829 P .2d at 1345.
Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a
manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779
P.2d 15, 17 (1989). This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance. Id.
To be valid as a marital settlement agreement the Covenant must be "acknowledged and
proved in like manner as conveyances of land" and follow the normal rules of contract
construction. As will be shown herein, the lower courts properly found that the Covenant fails to
meet both tests.

C. Jerry Was Not a Party to the Covenant
"When a written instrument is complete on its face and is unambiguous, extrinsic
evidence of prior or contemporaneous representations or negotiations are inadmissible to
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contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the instmment's terms." Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont

Cnty. , 152 Idaho 207, 211,268 P.3d 1159, 1163 (2012). Only when a document is ambiguous is
parol evidence admissible to discover the drafter's intent. Id. As Jerry notes, the lower courts did
not find, nor did either party argue that the Covenant was ambiguous. Appellant 's Brief at 21.
His arguments about his intent, including how the Covenant came to be and his actions based on
his understanding of the Covenant are completely irrelevant.
In order for there to be a marriage settlement agreement, as opposed to a simple
conveyance of property, both parties to .the marriage must of necessity be parties to the
agreement. As the magistrate court found , and the district court affirmed, Jerry was not a party
to the Covenant, but rather the Covenant was, on its face, an agreement between Adam Davis
and Veronika. After a series of "Whereas" recitations regarding Jerry and his partner Melissa
Davis, the Covenant stated, "NOW, THEREFORE, WE the undersigned spouses of the Partners
do hereby and herewith affirm each and all of the following." R. Vol. I, p. 275. The Covenant
then set forth what Veronika and Adam agreed to. There were no provisions in the Covenant
stating that Jerry and Melissa agreed to anything whatsoever. There was nothing to show that
Jerry was offering Veronika anything or that Veronika was offering Jerry anything.
References to "party" or "parties" can only refer to Adam and Veronika, for the Covenant
stated, "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed, sealed and acknowledged this
Covenant on the date(s) written below." R. Vol. I., p. 278, emphasis added. The Covenant only
contained signature lines for Adam and Veronika. Not only did Jerry and his partner not sign the
original document, there was no section provided for them to sign.
Jerry argues that he and his partner later signed "an acknowledgement agreeing to be
bound by the Covenant" and therefore they were parties to the agreement. Appellant's Brief at
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20. What he fails to note for the Court is that this purported acknowledgement in February 2015
was signed after divorce was filed, August 13 , 2014, and after Veronika filed her motion for
summary judgment, February 2, 2015. Veronika was not a party to the acknowledgment, which
was executed without her knowledge or consent. Jerry would have this Court find that he was a
party to an agreement made in contemplation of divorce, based on self-serving actions he took
after Veronika moved for summary judgment to declare the Covenant invalid.
The magistrate court based its findings on substantial and competent evidence, and its
conclusions oflaw follow from those findings. Therefore, the district court properly affinned the
magistrate's decision.

D. The Covenant Lacked Mutuality and Consideration
In Idaho, a written instrument is presumptive evidence of consideration, I.C. § 29-103.
That presumption is rebuttable and not conclusive. A party seeking to avoid or invalidate
the contract may introduce evidence of a lack of consideration. I.C. § 29-104; Rosenberry v.

Clark, 85 Idaho 317, 379 P.2d 638 (1963). In this case, the evidence that the Covenant lacked
consideration was the Covenant itself.
The Covenant was not a unilateral contract, where an offeror makes a promise that is
conditional on the offeree' s acceptance by rendition of the requested performance, Deer Creek,

Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. , 107 Idaho 286,291 , 688 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Ct.App.
1984), 1 RICHARD A . LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1.17 (4th ed. 2007).
Veronika did not make a promise to anything conditional on the performance of another party.
The Covenant was therefore a bilateral contract. Such a contract requires mutuality of obligation.

It has long been established in Idaho that there can be no binding bilateral contract unless both of
the parties are bound. Hoffman v. S V Company, Inc. , 102 Idaho 187, 220, 628 P .2d 218, 221
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(Idaho 1981); Houser v. Hobart, 22 Idaho 735, 744, 127 P. 997, 1006 (1912). In Houser v.

Hobart, supra, the Court stated:
"It is a general principle in the law of contracts, but not without exception, that an
agreement entered into between parties competent to contract, in order to be
binding, must be mutual ; and this is especially so when the consideration consists
of mutual promises. In such cases, if it appears that the one party never was bound
on his part to do the act which fonns the consideration for the promise of the other,
the agreement is void for want of mutuality."

And as the question under consideration is new in this state, this court will adopt
that view which it considers to rest upon good reason and sound principle.

Houser, 22 Idaho at 744 (quoting Wilkinson v. Heavenrich, 58 Mich. 574, 55 Am. Rep. 708, 26
N.W. 139). This doctrine is interwoven with the issue of consideration.

In McCandless v.

Schick, 85 Idaho 509, 514,3 80 P. 2.d 893,898 (1963) the Court stated:
Mutuality of obligation as pertains to an executory contract requires that each
party to the agreement be bound to perfonn; if it appears that one party was never
bound on his part to do the acts which form the consideration for the promi se of
the other, there is a lack of mutuality of obligation, and the other party is not
bound. Houser v. Hobart, 22 Idaho 735, 127 P. 997, 43 L.R.A. ,N.S., 410; Zaring
v. Lavatta, 36 Idaho 459, 211 P. 557. This doctrine is interwoven with the basic
requirement for consideration to support a binding agreement; if one party is not
bound to perform his promise, the consideration for the other party's agreement is
lacking, 12 Am.Jur., Contracts§ 13 ; 17 C.J.S. Contracts§ 100.

Jerry did not promise to do anything under the Covenant. Even if the Covenant had provided
some promise on the part of Jerry, he did not sign it, and therefore was not bound to perform.

Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Pac[fic Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 31 P.3d 921
(2001); Houser, supra. There was therefore no mutuality to the Covenant as between Veronika
and Jerry. 1 Jerry not being bound to perform anything, the Covenant lacked consideration as a
marriage settlement agreement. McCandless, supra.

1

Assuming for the sake of argument that Jerry' s signature was not required under I.C. § 55-601 and§ 32-719 , it was
still required for the formation of a valid contract between himself and Veronika.
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Though the decisions of the Magistrate and District Court were predicated on the finding
that the Covenant was between Adam Davis and Veronika, and focused on the lack of
consideration between Mr. Davis and Veronika, they were correct as a matter of law that there
was not sufficient consideration for there to be a valid marriage settlement agreement.

E. The District Court Reached the Correct Result Under J.C.§ 55-601.
The Covenant is further deficient under I.C. § 32-917 and LC. § 55-60 I. Jerry would
have this Court hold that Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 219, 192 P.3d 1036, 1043 (2008)
allows parties to deviate from the requirements of LC. § 32-917 and LC. § 55-601. He argues
that in Chavez "the agreement signed in that case apparently only identified the physical address
to the community home" Appellant 's Brief at 17, and therefore the Covenant did not have to
strictly comply with the mailing address requirement under LC. § 55-601. A careful reading
shows that nothing in the decision by the Chavez Court supports this conclusion.
In Chavez, the appellant challenged the district court's holding that she did not have real
property interest in the marital home. The question was not whether there was a valid marital
settlement agreement, but rather focused on a specific clause at issue, that could have been
"more artfully drafted." Id at 219. The clause of the parties' Agreement provided that: "The
house located at 363 W 150 N, Blackfoot, Idaho," and "All equity in the house" are to be
"distributed" to Barrus subject to his "obligation to pay [Chavez] a portion of her equity." The
Agreement further "distributed" the debt on the residence to Barrus.

Chavez, 146 Idaho at 219,

192 P.3d at 1043.
After detennining that this clause was sufficient to show the parties' intent that "the clear
intention of the parties was for Barrus to receive the home and for Chavez to receive a lien in her
favor," Id., the Court later noted that the agreement satisfied the requirements of LC. § 32-917.
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Id. at 220. In making this detennination, the Court cited I.C. § 55-60 I, which requires that "the
name of the Grantee and his complete mailing address must appear on such instrument."

Id.

The specific requirement of the grantee's mailing address was not at issue, and therefore not
discussed by the Court. It is far more reasonable to assume that the agreement in Chavez did in
fact contain the complete mailing address of the Grantee as required by statute. Far from carving
out the exception Jerry seeks, Chavez reinforces the requirements clearly set out by statute.
The additional authority cited by Jerry are distinguishable and likewise do not support the
rule Jerry would establish here. In KEB Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 101 P.3d
690 (2004), the Court upheld the district court's determination that the address was sufficient for
the grantee, who lived in a small rural town, to receive mail.

Mail addressed simply to

"Veronika Papin, Idaho Falls, Idaho" would not be delivered. In Adams v. Anderson, 142 Idaho
208, 127 P.3d 111 (2005), there was significant detail as to the location of the grantee including
lot, block, street, city, county and legal description.

There is no such minute detail in the

Covenant. In City of Kellog v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915
(2000) the Court stated, "The City of Kellogg is a well-known municipality in the State of Idaho.

It has corporate boundaries and is located in Shoshone County. The address of the City of
Kellogg is the City of Kellogg." Id. at 243, 16 P.3d at 919. An individual, even if well-known,
could not be said to be their own address, with boundaries locatable on a map. The address of
Veronika Papin is not Veronika Papin. The exceptions cited to by Jerry do not apply here.
Jerry's parade of horribles argument that "thousands" of agreements would be invalidated
in Idaho by the Court requiring adherence to the clear requirements of statute is unsupported in
fact or argument. The possible fact that some attorneys draft agreements that fail to comply with
the law does not justify bending the clear intent of the legislature.
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requirement; it is a simple matter to include an address in an agreement. If anything, it is the
attorneys' practice that should change, not the law.
Therefore, the district court, in reviewing the validity of the Covenant, properly upheld
the magistrate's award of summary judgment on the basis that it was not a valid marital
settlement agreement.

II. THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY DETERMINED JERRY'S INTEREST IN STRAIGHT LINE
GROUP WAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY

The magistrate made extensive findings and conducted a thorough analysis regarding
Jerry's financial planning business, including history, tracing, and Jerry' s credibility in his
description of his business. Aug. p. 23-36. On appeal, Jerry presents nothing more than a smoke
and mirrors argument that he, personally, is both the business and the asset to be valued and
traced, and therefore anything related to his business is separate property. Clearing away the
smoke we find that the Magistrate 's determination that Jerry' s interest in Straight Line was
community property was supported by competent and substantial evidence.
A. Jerry Had the Burden of Tracing any Separate Property Interest

It is well established in Idaho that any asset acquired during marriage is rebuttably
presumed to be community property and the burden of proof rests with the party asserting a
separate property interest. I.C. § 32-906; Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461 , 546 P .2d 1169 (1976);

Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526
P.2d 844 (1974); Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 512 P.2d 1317 (1973), 97 Idaho 316, 543
P.2d 869 (197 5). The party asserting the separate property interest bears the burden to prove to
the Court with reasonable certainty and particularity the separate nature of these funds . Speer v.

Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 131 , 525 P.2d 314,326 (1973); In re Estate of Cooke, 96 Idaho 48, 524
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P.2d 176 (1974); Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794,797, 430 P.2d 685,688 (1967). The best evidence
to prove the separate nature of property is to provide the Court with accounting evidence or
tracing. Houska, 95 Idaho at 570, 512 P.2d at 1319.
Jerry argues that "it is simply undisputed that the business predated the marriage by over
a decade and is separate property." Appellant's Brief at 22. However, this has been very much
in dispute from the beginning of this matter. Veronika acknowledges that Jerry has been in the
financial industry since 1991 and that Jerry has owned various financial advising businesses
since that date. However, the business at issue is Straight Line Investment Group, which was
established during the marriage. The relevant timeline is as follows :
•

2003 - Parties married.

•

2005 - Jerry formed Jerry Papin Support Services ("JPSS") in Idaho. R. Vol I. , p 121.

•

August 31 , 2011 - Jerry enters into Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Practice with
Brinton R. Webb, which states that "Buyer agrees to purchase Seller's Business and
Assets, as they exist." Trial Exhibit 1. "Assets" are defined on page l of the Agreement
as the Seller's (Jerry's) "client base" and the purchase price is set at $504,000.00. Jd. On
the same date, Jerry executes an Amendment to the Agreement for Purchase and Sale of
Practice, which gives Jerry the right to compete and to "solicit clients of the business
described in the Agreement to move some or all of their accounts from Ameriprise to
Seller's new Industry business." Trial Exhibit 1 (emphasis added.) The Amendment also
provides for a reduction in the purchase price if Jerry solicits away more than
$12,500,000.00. Id.

•

September 2011 - Jerry signs operating agreement with Melissa Davis for Straight Line
Investment Group, LLC (Trial Exhibit 9); Jerry registers Straight Line Investment Group,
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LLC in Nevada. That same month the Financial Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA)
launches investigation into Jerry's activities. R. Vol I., p. 125 .
•

October 2011 - Jerry amends name of Jerry Papin Support Services to Straight Line
Investment Group, LLC. Trial Exhibit 7.

•

November 16, 2011 - notifies Mr. Webb that he is "keeping" $16,900,000.00 in assets
under management, which triggered the penalty clause in the Amendment to the purchase
and sale agreement. Trial Exhibit 5.
At the time of the sale to Mr. Webb, Jerry's business was providing financial

management services as an independent contractor with Ameriprise Financial. Under the clear
terms of the Agreement between Jerry and Mr. Webb, this business and the entirety of Jerry's
business assets - Jerry's client base - were transferred to Mr. Webb. The record shows that Mr.
Webb made payments as agreed under the contract of sale. Under his contract with Mr. Webb
the client base ceased to be Jerry's business asset. These client accounts were not his to "keep"
but must be reacquired.

Any client relationships Jerry or his business had or acquired after the

sale to Mr. Webb were part of Jerry's new business, as referenced in the Agreement, which
business was established during the marriage.
Jerry attempts to get around this by presenting an argument that he, not the business
entity, is the business, and since he cannot be community property the business is not community
property. Jerry describes the "business" as his client relationships, inseparable from himself,

Appellant's Brief at 23 , and states that the separate property asset is "the client relationships and
Jerry's skills and expertise in investment management."2 Appellant's Brief at 22. "The various

2

It is not disputed that Jerry's skills and expertise are not community property. See, Wolford v. Wolford, 117 Idaho
61 , 67, 785 P.2d 625,631 (1990) (holding that personal attributes, including knowledge, skill, and reputation, are
not property, either separate or community);
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administrative and tax entities like JPSS or SLG are not and have never been the business." 3

Appellant 's Brief at 24. Jerry alleges that the business entities "did not and do not own anything
other than some insignificant office equipment and, with regard to SLG, possibly a few
accounts." Id.
Jerry's argument is contradicted by the evidence and Jerry's own admission. Under the

Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Practice, on page 2, Jerry sold his "Business and Assets as
they exist."

Trial Exhibit G.

If the business is "essentially worthless" without the Jerry,

Appellant's Brief at 24, then what was Jerry selling to Webb for $504,000? It certainly was not
the " insignificant" office equipment. Jerry was not selling himself, his knowledge or expertise.
He was selling a business with assets separate from Jerry himself. Jerry acknowledges this in hi s
attempt to separate the assets from the business entities. "Mr. Webb did not buy an entity or
portion thereof such as JPSS or SLG, but rather client relationships." Appellant's Brief at 24.
Clearly, these client relationships were separable from Jerry.
Whether Jerry "kept" or reacquired the client accounts, it was while he was operating
under his "new Industry business", JPSS or the Straight Line Group, which were fonned after
mamage. Jerry still claims these and other client accounts or relationships to be part of his
business. However, Jerry is not, and was not at the time of divorce, licensed or registered with
any regulatory authority. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1185, I. 18-24; Trial Exhibit 8. Pursuant to the Idaho
Uniform Securities Act, Jerry cannot provide investment advice, access client account data or
conduct transactions on a client's behalf. LC.§ 30-14-101 et. seq. He can have no role of any
kind in portfolio management.

Id.

His assertion that "[i]f Jerry walks, the clients walk",

Appellant's Brief at 24, strains belief, particularly since it is his partner who interacts with the
3

Jerry relies on Stewart, 143 Idaho at 67-78, 142 P.3d at 458-49 for this proposition. This authority in fact says
nothing of the sort, but rather addresses the valuation of goodwill in a professional services corporation.
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clients and manages their assets. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1185-1186. If Jerry were to leave Straight Line,
the clients and their accounts could remain at Straight Line without interruption. Therefore, the
client accounts, which are the only business assets of any value, must belong to the business
entity, not Jerry personally. The uncontested evidence is that Straight Line Investment Group
was established during the marriage. Jerry's ownership interest in the business is community
property.
Jerry tries to equate his (now former) profession with his business. It should be noted
that a profession is not a business. Updegraffv. Adams, 66 Idaho 795, 169 P.2d 501 (1946); In re

Freeman's Estate, 311 N.E.2d 480, 486-87, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336, 342-43 (NY
1974). Professionals such as attorneys, accountants, engineers, counselors and financial planners,
may have their own independent practice, but they may also practice their professions as
employees. The practice of a profession does not automatically equate to a business. Likewise,
a professional may cultivate client relationships while part of one business or organization that
do not automatically move with the professional to another business, even if both businesses
were at one time owned by the same professional.
There was competent and substantial evidence before the trial court to determine that
Jerry had sold his separate property business, including all its assets, and started a new business
that was community property. The burden was therefore on Jerry to trace any separate property
interest.

B. Jerry Failed to Reasonably Trace His Separate Property Interest
Jerry' s argument is that he never transferred some of the client accounts and therefore
they continued to be his separate property.

However, Jerry failed to provide any reliable

evidence whatsoever of the clients he had at the time of marriage, transferred to Mr. Webb, or
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reacquired from Mr. Webb. He also failed to provide reliable documentation of clients acquired
by SLG after marriage, the total value of the business assets or any other objective third party
documentation reliably tracing the business assets.
Jerry merely provided summary documents, prepared by himself. Jerry did not provide
his expert accountant, David Smith, with any underlying documentation to verify the accuracy of
Jerry's representations at trial, and Mr. Smith did not conduct any forensic audit. The documents
did not list the value of the client accounts to the business, but the value of the clients' assets.
No evidence was presented of the value of assets Jerry claimed pre-dated the formation of
Straight Line in relation to the total value of the business. Jerry does not argue to the contrary,
but rather asserts that asset to be traced is his skill and reputation, Appellant's Brief at 28-30.
Jerry's expertise and professional goodwill are not at issue. At issue are client accounts which,
as established herein, have value separate from Jerry himself.
Jerry argues that the lower courts incorrectly focused on the assets under management
(AUM). It is true that the AUM belong to the client, not the business. However, as client assets,
the AUM follow the client.

A careful reading of the Magistrate's decision shows that the

Magistrate used AUM primarily as a shorthand to refer to the client accounts listed in Trial
Exhibits 2,3 and 4. Aug. p 27-28, 33-34. Ultimately, as shown herein, Jerry failed to trace these
client accounts to a reasonable certainty and particularity, Speer, supra, AUM or no. While the
Magistrate did incorrectly look at the values of the AUM as a possible method of valuing the
business, the Magistrate ultimately abandoned that line of thinking and applied a different
method independent of any AUM consideration. Any misunderstanding regarding the AUM by
the lower courts did not affect the substantial rights of the parties and was harmless error.

Schneider v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 415,427, 258 P.3d 350,362 (2011); I.R.F.L.P. 801.
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Jerry seeks to excuse his failure to adequately trace any separate property interest by
arguing that the Magistrate should have considered the Covenant as rebutting the presumption of
a community property interest in his business, even though she determined the Covenant to be
invalid as a marital settlement agreement. Appellant's Brief at 30. It is "the trial court's special
role to weigh conflicting evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses." Kelly v. Wagner, 161
Idaho 906, 910, 393 P .3d 566, 570 (2017).

The Magistrate weighed the all the evidence,

including the Covenant. Jerry cites no authority for the proposition that the Covenant should be
given particular weight or automatically rebut a statutory presumption.

The district court appropriately upheld the Magistrate's determination Jerry's interest in
Straight Line was community property.

III.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN VALUING THE

BUSINESS

The primary concern for the trial court is ascertaining the "true" value of the business.

Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 250, 32 P.3d 140, 144 (2001).
methodologies may be used. Id.

Various acceptable

How the trial court assesses and weighs each method and

variable with it, in each particular case, is within that court's discretion. Id. A court is not bound
by the testimony of experts. See, I.R.E. 702; I.R.F.L.P. 801 ; Simpson v. Johnson , 100 Idaho
357, 597 P.2d 600 (1979) (expert opinion not binding on trier of fact and, provided the trier of
fact does not act arbitrarily, may be rejected even when uncontradicted). In a divorce proceeding,
the Magistrate, not the appellate court, resolves the conflicting evidence and determines the
weight, credibility and inferences to be drawn from such evidence." Weilmunster v.

Weilmunster, 124 Idaho 227, 238, 858 P.2d 766, 777 (Ct.App. 1993).
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The Magistrate reviewed the opinions of both experts, and identified the difficulty of
valuing this particular business. Aug. p. 29-34. Ultimately, the Magistrate did not apply the
methodology of either expe1t, but adopted a value that Je1Ty himself had placed on the business.
Aug. p. 65; Trial Exhibit 10. The Amended Operating Agreement for Straight Line, executed
July 5, 2013 set the value at $210,826.68, with Jerry's ownership interest valued at $105,413.34.
This was the value adopted by the Magistrate. While Jerry argues that the business was worth
more to the present owners than to a third-party buyer, Appellant 's Brief at 31 , the fact that a
willing buyer had previously purchased Jerry's business in the same industry at an initial price of
$504,000.00, shows that the Magistrate's valuation was not unreasonable.
Jerry himself offered no valuation on the business.

Even though he argues that the

Operating Agreement set forth a formula for calculating the value of the business, he admits that
"No attempt was even made to do the calculation for the current year at trial."

Id. at 32. Had

Jerry wanted to establish the value of the business under that formula, he was free to present
evidence showing such value. He failed to do so.
The Magistrate was within her discretion to weigh the different options for valuation and
choose the one most suited to the evidence before her. The District Court did not err in affirming
the Magistrate.

IV. DIVISION OF PROPERTY

A. The Magistrate Properly Determined that a Portion of the Sale Proceeds from Jerry's
Business were Community Property.

Jerry' s own expert, David Smith, opined that if the Covenant is not a valid agreement,
then 97% of the $367,500.00 proceeds from the sale of the client list to Mr. Webb is Jerry's
separate property. Mr. Smith went on to state that $229,529.40 of those funds were separate
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property, and of that separate property, $ 183,358.65 remains in the MPCU account. Mr. Smith
also testified that $25,000.00 of those separate funds were withdrawn from the MPCU account
and deposited into the Schwab Joint Investment Account ( acct. no. 1216-3224). According to Mr.
Smith, only $13, 154.65 of Jerry's separate property remains in the Schwab Investment Account
as a result of market depreciation. Veronika's expert, Ms. Gazdik testified that she could trace
funds from the sale being deposited into the joint MPCU account, but not being taken out in any
discemable fashion . No actual tracing had been done by Mr. Smith. TR. V. I. , p. 353, I. 18-25, p.
353, I. 2-3 .

There was substantial and competent evidence before the Magistrate to determine

that a portion of the proceeds from J e1Ty's business was community property. The District Court
properly affirmed.

B. The District Court Properly Affirmed the Magistrate's Determination Regarding the
Marital Home.
There was no dispute at trial that Je1Ty purchased the marital home prior to ma1Tiage. The
only dispute regarding the marital home was the community pay-down of the mortgage during
the ma1Tiage, and reimbursement of property taxes paid by the community during the marriage.
Jerry argues that the magistrate improperly assigned him the burden of proof in establishing how
much of the principal was paid down during the marriage. Jerry cites to Bliss v. Bliss, which
stands for the proposition that once established that property was purchased prior to ma1Tiage,
the burden shifts to the party trying to claim a community interest in the property. 127 Idaho l 70,
173 , 898 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1995)

In this case, neither party disputes that there is a community

interest in the home. The only issue in contention is the amount of community interest. While it
is true that Veronika bears the burden in demonstrating the community interest in the home, the
burden she must meet is only clear and convincing evidence.
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At trial, Veronika introduced expert testimony, an amortization schedule, a true and
accurate mortgage statement depicting a $1500.00 payment; and a mortgage statement showing a
final payoff of $3,846.77, to support her testimony that the community paid $1500.00 each
month towards the mortgage during the marriage. Jerry on the other hand, merely testified that
the parties made $785.42 payments on the mortgage, and provided his own self-created
amortization schedule which assumed a beginning principal balance of $39,921.61, with
minimum monthly payments until May 2008. Trial Exhibit GGGG. However, the amortization
schedule did not include his alleged 24 months of overpayments from the time of refinance to the
date of marriage. Moreover, Jerry's schedule showed a final payoff of $781.00 in May 2008,
which does not comport with the actual official payoff document, provided by Veronika, which
showed a $3,846.77 payoff.
In this case, Veronika provided the magistrate court with credible evidence generated by
an expert and the lender which supported her testimony that the parties paid $1500.00 on the
mortgage each month until May 2008. Jerry provided only his self-serving testimony and an
amortization schedule created by himself to prove something different. Although Jerry did not
carry the burden of proof, if anyone was equipped to definitively settle this conflict it would have
been Jerry. As the holder of the mortgage, Jerry had access to all the mortgage documents which
would have shown the mortgage payments during the marriage. He did not submit this evidence
however, so the magistrate was left to weigh the evidence which was provided. The magistrate
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that clear and convincing evidence existed which
would support a monthly community payment of $1500.00 per month during the marriage, with
a beginning mortgage balance of $72,680.57.
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As for the property taxes on the home, the Court in Swanson v. Swanson specifically held
that the community is entitled to reimbursement for husband 's separate tax liability paid by the
community during the marriage. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 5 P.3d 973 (2000). Jerry
argues that to the extent Swanson applies here, it is not equitable as a matter of law. Jerry
acknowledges that in Swanson it would not have been equitable for the community to bear the
tax liability of the husband's separate property sale of stock, and yet it is somehow equitable for
the community to bear the burden of Jerry's separate property taxes . Jerry benefited directly from
these community payments of the property taxes. If the taxes had not been paid on Jerry's
separate property home, interest and penalties would have accrued, a lien would have been
placed on the property, and the property potentially could have been sold at a tax sale. In other
words, Jerry will get to sell his home for its fair market value and without encumbrances due to
the community payments of the property taxes. It is hard to imagine a scenario where a
reimbursement to the community for these payments made would not be equitable. The District
Court properly affinned the Magistrate 's decision.
C. The Magistrate Properly Divided the Community Property and Debt
The disposition of community property is a discretionary decision for the trial court.

Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544 (2007). However, the Court must exercise sound
discretion through the exercise of reason. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho J 70 P.3d 375 (2007).
Community property must be assigned by the court in such proportions as the court, with all the
facts, deems just. LC. §32-712. When determining whether property should be divided equally,
the court must consider 1) the duration of the marriage; 2) the existence of a prenuptial
agreement; 3) the age, health, occupation amount and source of income for the parties; 4) the
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needs of each spouse; 5) whether the apportionment is in lieu or in addition to maintenance; 6)
the present and potential earning capability of each party; and 7) retirement benefits.
Jerry alleges that the Magistrate 's division of property and debt was error, contending that
the Court divided the property submitted at trial for illustrative reasons only, and which were not
admitted as actual exhibits. Jerry particularly challenges the decision with regard to personal
property. Jerry did not put forth at trial or on appeal any alternative by which the Magistrate
could have divided the property.
In its Memorandum Decision, the magistrate court went to great lengths to analyze each
statutory factor pertaining to the division of community property and debt. Memorandum

Decision, pp. 54-56. Based upon the statutory factors, the Court found that there was no reason
to make an unequal division of community property. The Court made the decision to divide the
property and debt proportionally, and went off of the best information it had been provided to
dete1mine which property/debt would be assigned to which party. If the Court did not go off of
documents put forth at trial, then the Court would have nothing to divide.
In affirming the Magistrate, the District Court noted:
[T]he magistrate should have relied on the parties' testimony, which the
exhibits were intended to illustrate. As the magistrate noted, however, for most of
the items on the exhibits there was "no specific testimony." Oct 19, 2015 Mem.
Dec. at 22, ,r 63. Nonetheless, at trial, the magistrate also indicated that the
parties had been given sufficient time and opportunity to finalize and reconcile
their separate lists, with the scheduling order requiring the lists to be finished by
the time of pretrial conference.
Because the items included on each party's list were substantially identical,
the parties in essence stipulated to the items ' existence and the need to divide
them. The exhibits also provide a value range for each item. Idaho Code § 32712 grants the magistrate the power to distribute the community property and the
homestead. The magistrate went through each of the factors in Section 32-712
and determined that an equitable distribute should be made.
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R. Vol. I, p. I 004. There was no dispute as to whether or not the property and debts existed - the
Magistrate did not make them up out of thin air. Had the parties testified to each and every item
on the lists the result would have been the same. Requiring the parties to return before the
Magistrate and testify to each of the items would only result in unnecessary time and expense.
The Magistrate did not abuse her discretion, and it was not error for the District court to affirm.

V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE'S GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

Jerry challenges the District Court's affirmation of the Magistrate's refusal to find
adultery as grounds for divorce. Jerry fails identify the relevance to any issue before the Court,
but presumably Jerry would have this weigh on an analysis of spousal maintenance. "Divorces
based on adultery should be granted only upon very clear and conclusive evidence of the
adultery." Ross v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406,409,649 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1982).
On appeal to the District Court Jerry pointed to the testimony of Jennifer Keil, who stated
that Veronika confessed she had a sexual relationship with a man named Palov during the parties'
marriage. Ms. Keil also testified however, that Veronika told her that Jerry was "abusive.
Sexually abusive. Horrific stories." And that she suggested Veronika go to a women's shelter. Tr.

V. II. P. 906, I. 13-14. If the Court were to find that adultery was the cause of the divorce based
solely on Ms. Keil 's testimony, then the Court would also have no choice but to find that extreme
cruelty existed as well.

Beyond Ms. Keil 's testimony, Jerry can only point to circumstantial

evidence that supports no particular conclusion other than the marriage was falling apart. This is
not clear and conclusive evidence of adultery. The District Court therefore correctly affirmed the
determination of the Magistrate.
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VI. THE DISTRJCT COURT DID NOT ERR IN UPHOLDING THE MAGISTRATE'S AWARD OF
SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
In her memorandum decision, the magistrate awarded Veronika spousal maintenance in
the amount of $2,000.00 until the property equalization had been made, and then $750.00 per
month for a period of two (2) years or until Veronika remarried-whichever came sooner. Aug. p .
57,

,rs7.

It is within the court's discretion to award spousal maintenance and to detennine the

appropriate amount thereof. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 677 (2007) . The court is not
required to state the specific reasons in support of its decision as to the amount and duration of
the award, as long as the reasoning is clear from the record. Wilson v. Wilson, 13 l Idaho 533 , 535
( 1998). J.C. § 32-705 provides that:
1. Where a divorce is decreed the court may grant a maintenance order if it
finds the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable
needs;
(b) Is unable to support himself or herself through employment;
2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of
time that the court deems just, after considering all relevant factors which
may include:
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance,
including the marital property apportioned to said spouse, and
said spouse's ability to meet his or her needs independently;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to
enable the spouse seeking maintenance to find employment;
(c) The duration of the marriage;
(d) The age and physical and emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance;
(e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to
meet his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance;
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse;
(g) The fault of either party.
The Magistrate properly awarded maintenance under LC. § 32-705, and the District Court
properly affirmed.
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A. Threshold Test
Jerry completely fails to challenge the Magistrate's threshold findings that Veronika did
not have sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and could not fully support
herself through employment. Jerry instead jumps directly to the factors for detennining the
amount and duration of the award.
However, to be clear, the Magistrate properly found that Veronika meets the test under
LC. § 32-705(1 ). The Magistrate analyzed income, expenses and employment. She reduced
Veronika's claimed expenses from $5,155.00 to $2,760.00.

For purposes of analysis, the

Magistrate also assumed full time employment. Even with reduced expenses and assumed fulltime employment the evidence showed a shortfall in Veronika's ability to meet her monthly
expenses. Aug. p. 54-55 . The Magistrate further found that Veronika "has not herself earned
enough credits to qualify for social security on her own and has no other known retirement. "
Aug. p. 56. The Magistrate reasonably found that with Veronika earning minimum wage, and no
retirement assets, the property awarded to her in the divorce would therefore be necessary to
support her in retirement. This would necessarily limit how much could be used to support her
until retirement age. Having met the threshold test, it was proper for the Magistrate to award
spousal maintenance.

B. Amount and Duration of Maintenance
The Magistrate limited the amount and duration of the spousal maintenance award, based
on the factors in LC. § 32-705(2). The Magistrate provided for a significant reduction in the
maintenance amount upon property equalization, with maintenance terminating two years after
that date or upon remarriage, whichever occurred sooner. The factors support the Magistrate's
decision.
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(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance.
Throughout the marriage and at the time of divorce, Veronika worked part-time in a
minimum wage job framing pictures in an art gallery. Even working full-time, Veronika would
not have sufficient income to meet her monthly expenses. The Magistrate awarded Veronika and
equal share of the community property, or a net of $119,879.59 after debts. These assets would
take time to divide, and as noted by the Magistrate, would be necessary to support Veronika in
retirement.

Jerry would also have this Court reduce the property awarded to Veronika as

community assets, further reducing her ability to independently provide for her needs .

(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training.
Veronika had very little in the way of job experience or training. It was reasonable for
the Magistrate to find that Veronika would need to acquire further education and training to
improve her employability and earning capacity. Veronika may not have previously voiced plans
to go to school or receive training, but that does not preclude the Court from providing her a path
to do so.

(c) The duration of the marriage
The parties were married twelve years.

(d) The age and physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance.
At the time of divorce, Veronika was 40 years old, with 25 years left until retirement.
She was in good physical health, though there was evidence that veronica was suffering from
some anxiety. Tr. Vol. I, p. 573, l. 2-5.
(e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs while

meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance;
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Jerry testified that he is paid $8,500.00 per month by Straight Line. Additional income
from other sources, such as his own investments, is unknown. Jerry claimed monthly expenses
of $10,159.12 Trial Exhibit D.

As she had with Veronika, the Magistrate reviewed these

expenses and identified those that were non-essential. The Magistrate found that Jerry's essential
expenses totalled $6,015.80, leaving him with a surplus of$2,484.20 a month. Aug. p. 55. Jerry
has not challenged these factual findings on appeal.
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse;

There was no evidence regarding tax consequences to either party.

(g) The fault of either party.
Jerry argues that even if the Magistrate did not grant the divorce on the grounds of
adultery that she should have considered adultery in the spousal maintenance analysis. However,
even if there was evidence of adultery, there was likewise evidence of Jerry's abusive treatment
of Veronika. Therefore, this factor does not favor either party.

VI. THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY EXERCISED DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES.

A. The Magistrate Completed the Required Analysis to Award Fees.
The decision of whether to award attorney fees pursuant to J.C. §32-704 is discretionary.

Perez v. Perez, 134 Idaho 555 (Ct. App. 2000). An award of attorney's fees in a divorce action is
governed by J.C. § 32-704(3) and the factors set forth in J.C. § 32-705(2). Stephens v. Stephens,
13 8 Idaho 195 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
Jerry argues that the Court did not conduct an independent analysis of the statutory
factors in her Memorandum Decision on Fees. However, as the District Court noted, R. Vol. I. ,
p. l O11 , the Magistrate first made the determination that Veronika was entitled to attorney fees
in her Memorandum Decision regarding the divorce action. Aug. p. 58 . . In the Memorandum
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Decision, the Magistrate analyzed the factors under LC. § 32-705(2), when awarding Veronika
temporary spousal maintenance. Aug. p. 40-41, 56-57. Immediately following that analysis, the
Magistrate determined that Veronika was a prevailing party in part and entitled to two-thirds of
her attorney fees. The Magistrate had clearly completed and delineated the necessary analysis,
and it was not necessary for the Magistrate to restate it in her Memorandum Decision Re:
Attorney Fees.

B. The Magistrate Properly Determined Reasonableness of Fees.
A party seeking attorney fees does not have to establish their reasonableness to the
satisfaction of the opposing party, but to the satisfaction of the court awarding fees. In making
an award of attorney fees the trial court considers the factors in l.R.F.L.P. 908.
The trial court must only have sufficient information to make a decision. In addressing
Rule 908's corollary in the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals has stated:
If we require the trial court to consider the enumerated factors in rule 54( e)(3 ),
thein it logically follows as a corollary that the court must have sufficient
information at its disposal concerning those factors. Some information may come
from the court's own knowledge and experience, some may come from the record
of the case, but some obviously can only by supplied by the attorney of the party
who is requesting the fee award.

Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261 , 264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct. App. 1985)(emphasis added) .
Extensive evidence is not necessary. In Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 261,266; 629 P.2d 657, 662,
n.2 (Idaho 1981) this Court stated:
It is not essential in every case that evidence must be submitted justifying the
reasonableness of an attorney fee or an award thereof. In Dykstra v. Dykstra, 94
Idaho 797,800,498 P.2d 1270, 1273 (1972), this court observed:
"For too many years this court has required the introduction of evidence to sustain
a finding and conclusion of the trial court that attorneys' fees are 'reasonable and
necessary' in amount. See, e.g.: Muckle v. Hill, 32 Idaho 661 , 187 P. 943 (1920).
That theory does have validity in complex and difficult cases wherein large sums
are sought for attorneys' fees for services performed outside the presence of the
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court. However, it has little relevancy in a case such as presented herein where the
amount awarded is fairly supported by services rendered in the presence of the
trial court or reflected by the files of the court."
Id. In the present case, a significant portion of services was rendered in the presence of the
Magistrate, work performed was reflected in the files of the court, Veronika's counsel submitted
clear and detailed documentation, R. Vol. I., p 741-766, and the Magistrate was well qualified by
her own knowledge and experience to make a determination on reasonableness.
The District Court properly affirmed the Magistrate's award of attorney fees.

VII. JERRY IS NOT ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
In order to recover an award of attorney fees on appeal , a party must support the request
both by citation to legal authority and argument. Clark v. Shari's Management Corp., 155 Idaho
576, 314 P.3d 631, (2013). "The mere citation to a code provision, without explaining how the
cited code section provides for an award in the case or providing argument of how the section
applies to the circumstances in the case, is insufficient for an award of attorney fees on
appeal." Athay v. Rich Cnty. , 153 Idaho 815,827, 291 P.3d 1014, 1026 (2012). Jerry requests
fees and costs based on the Covenant. As shown herein, the Covenant is invalid and cannot
serve as a basis for a fee request. Jerry fails to present any other argument than the bare assertion
that "[a]ny defense of this appeal is inherently unreasonable." Appellant's Brief at 48.
Jerry cites LC. § 12-121 as a basis for attorney fees. In order to be awarded fees on
appeal, Jerry must both prevail and show that Veronika defended the appeal "frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation." Id.; Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P .3d 608,
614 (2011 ). Where questions of law are raised, attorney fees should be awarded under LC. § 12121 only if the non-prevailing party advocated a plainly fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly
debatable position. Lowery v. Board of County Commissioners for Ada County, 115 Idaho
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64, 69, 764 P .2d 431, 436 (1988). "A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is
not, by itself, unreasonable conduct. [ ...] Rather, the question must be whether the position
adopted by the owner was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." Id.

Veronika's position on appeal is fairly

supported by both fact and law.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the decisions of the District Court on appeal from the Magistrate
should be affinned in their entirety and Appellant's appeal denied on all issues.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Respondent requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § § 12-121 ,
12-123, Idaho Family Law Rules 901 and 908, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Jerry's
circular and contradictory arguments regarding the nature and sale of his business, and the
validity of the Covenant are plainly fallacious and serve only to harass Veronika and increase
time and expense in resolving this matter.

Further, Jerry's dogged pursuit of a finding of

adultery, where such a finding could have little to no impact on the case "obviously serves
merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action." LC.§ 12-123. Veronika
should be awarded fees and costs in defending this appeal.
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